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The Sound of Death and “Shroud of Secrecy”: The Ninth Circuit’s
Inconsistent Application of the History and Logic Test in First

Amendment Coalition of Arizona, Inc. v. Ryan*

After the botched execution of Joseph Wood raised serious concerns about lethal
injections, the Ninth Circuit recognized a right of access to hearing executions in
its decision First Amendment Coalition of Arizona, Inc. v. Ryan. While
the court recognized a First Amendment right of access to the sounds of an
execution, the court failed to recognize a right of access to essential information
about lethal injection drugs and the qualifications of executioners. This
inconsistent recognition of a First Amendment right of access impedes public
scrutiny of the lethal injection process. Public scrutiny of executions is paramount
to ensure executions are conducted fairly and humanely.
This Recent Development analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ryan and its
failure to apply the history and logic test to recognize a right of access to
execution-related information. This Recent Development provides the history
and logic analysis to execution-related information that is absent in Ryan. In
so doing, it argues that a right of access to specific information about execution
drugs and the qualifications of executioners is necessary for public scrutiny of
lethal injections. Providing access to this type of information increases
transparency and accountability, thereby exposing to the public the efficacy of
lethal injection drugs in delivering a painless and humane death and the
qualification of executioners in properly administering the drugs.
INTRODUCTION
During his execution, Joseph Wood struggled to breathe and gasped in
agony for hours.1 Executions by lethal injection are supposed to be a swift and
humane process.2 For Mr. Wood, it took nearly two hours and fifteen doses of
* © 2021 Isabela Palmieri.
1. First Amend. Coal. of Ariz., Inc. v. Ryan, 938 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Wood’s
execution was botched in several ways. According to the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint, Wood
rose up and gasped for air about 12 minutes into his execution, after first appearing to be sedated. He
continued to struggle to breathe until he died, nearly two hours after the drugs were first
administered.”).
2. See Kate Pickert, A Brief History of Lethal Injection, TIME (Nov. 10,
2009), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1815535,00.html [https://perma.cc/E548AJ88] (“The first proposal for using injected drugs as a form of capital punishment came in the late
19th century, when a New York commission on capital punishment included the suggestion that the
method might prove more humane than hanging.”); see also Boer Deng & Dahlia Lithwick,
Liberal Guilt: In the Push To Abolish the Capital Punishment, Opponents of the Death Penalty Have Made
It Less Safe, SLATE (May 9, 2014, 5:14 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/05/death-
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lethal injection drugs, without any consciousness checks by the execution team
at any point during the process.3 Wood was injected with 750 milligrams of two
execution drugs—fifteen times the suggested amount in Arizona’s execution
protocol.4 Wood’s prolonged death took place a day after the U.S. Supreme
Court vacated a Ninth Circuit decision conditionally staying his execution.5
Wood’s botched execution is hardly the only one of its kind6 and will likely
not be the last. After a twenty-year moratorium on federal capital punishment,7
the Trump administration carried out thirteen federal executions while in
office—the most of any president in the last 120 years.8 During his campaign,
President Joe Biden pledged to pass legislation eliminating federal executions,9
but the ultimate success of such legislation is uncertain. In the absence of
substantial reform, greater transparency in capital punishment procedures is
essential.
penalty-in-america-how-the-push-to-abolish-capital-punishment-has-made-lethal-injection-less-safe.
html [https://perma.cc/L5F9-3BEK] (“Lethal injection was supposed to be the humane alternative to
firing squads and hangings.”). It has been strongly argued that the death penalty, regardless of how it
is administered, is inhumane. See generally Hugo Adam Bedau, The Case Against the Death
Penalty, ACLU (2012), https://www.aclu.org/other/case-against-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/
XH3C-68MP] (providing multiple objections to the death penalty based both in law and fact).
3. Ryan, 938 F.3d at 1073.
4. Tom Dart, Arizona Inmate Joseph Wood Was Injected 15 Times with Execution Drugs, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 2, 2014, 10:40 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/02/arizona-inmate-injected15-times-execution-drugs-joseph-wood [https://perma.cc/9JHN-F8M3] (“The state’s protocol gives
the prisons director a degree of flexibility in how the execution may proceed, but only explicitly allows
for ‘an additional dose’ of the chemicals that can be administered ‘if deemed appropriate’ after
consciousness checks are performed three minutes into the procedure.”) (last updated Oct. 6, 2018,
6:17 PM).
5. See Ryan v. Wood, 573 U.S. 976, 976–77 (2014).
6. In Oklahoma, the execution of Clayton Lockett lasted forty-three minutes, during which he
moaned, struggled, and was partially conscious. See Graham Lee Brewer & Manny Fernandez,
Oklahoma Botched 2 Executions. It Says It’s Ready To Try Again, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/us/oklahoma-executions.html?auth=login-email&login=email
[https://perma.cc/5X26-UBW9 (dark archive)]. In Ohio, the execution of Dennis McGuire took
twenty-four minutes—almost triple the average execution time—after the administration of a new drug
combination. See Mark Memmott, New Drug Combination Takes 24 Minutes To Execute Ohio Killer, NPR
(Jan. 16, 2014, 2:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/01/16/263099489/new-drugcombination-takes-24-minutes-to-execute-ohio-killer [https://perma.cc/6DYK-5SGZ].
7. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Federal Government to Resume Capital Punishment After
Nearly Two Decade Lapse (July 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-governmentresume-capital-punishment-after-nearly-two-decade-lapse [https://perma.cc/56TM-L5P4].
8. See Michael Tarm & Michael Kunzelman, Trump Administration Carries Out 13th and Final
Execution, AP NEWS (Jan. 15, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-wildlife-coronaviruspandemic-crime-terre-haute-28e44cc5c026dc16472751bbde0ead50 [https://perma.cc/9ZEK-CH2U].
9. The Biden Plan for Strengthening America’s Commitment to Justice, BIDEN HARRIS DEMOCRATS,
https://joebiden.com/justice/ [https://perma.cc/XG25-X4FF]. Even if President Biden is successful in
working with Congress to pass such legislation, several states still allow the death penalty. See State by
State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-bystate [https://perma.cc/553X-BPDY] (providing a fifty-state survey of the status of the death penalty
as an available sentencing measure).
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Following Wood’s execution, in First Amendment Coalition of Arizona, Inc.
v. Ryan,10 the Ninth Circuit found “serious due process concerns” in Arizona’s
execution procedures.11 Specifically, the court found that the procedures were
often covered with a “shroud of secrecy,” and that Arizona had a “pattern of
deviating from its lethal injection protocols.”12 The state’s lack of transparency
and inconsistent adherence to its own protocols seriously hindered judicial
review and public evaluation of execution procedures.13 Ultimately, the Ninth
Circuit heard challenges to two procedures of the Arizona Department of
Corrections (“ADC”).14 The first claim challenged the ADC’s practice of
turning off the overhead microphone during part of the execution, which limits
the ability of witnesses to hear any sounds a prisoner might make after
intravenous lines are inserted.15 The second claim challenged the ADC’s failure
to disclose information about the lethal injection drugs to be used in the
execution and the qualifications of execution team members.16
In Ryan, the Ninth Circuit recognized a First Amendment right to hear a
prisoner’s execution in its entirety.17 Having recognized that the public has an
expansive right of access to “observe and report” on the entire execution, the
Ninth Circuit noted that “[b]arring witnesses from hearing sounds . . . means
that the public will not have full information regarding the administration of
lethal injection drugs and the prisoner’s experience as he dies.”18 However, the
court found that neither the public nor the press has a right of access to
information regarding lethal injection drugs—including manufacturers, sellers,
lot numbers, National Drug Codes (“NDCs”), and expiration dates—or
documentation on the qualifications of executioners.19 As its justification, the
court found that because “[i]nformation regarding execution drugs and
personnel . . . differs from other documents to which the public has a right of
access,” the framework through which right of access cases are usually analyzed
did not apply.20 Instead, the Ninth Circuit should have recognized that the same
values exist in both the access to the auditory portion of executions and the
access to information about lethal injection drugs and personnel—the assurance
that executions via lethal injection are administered fairly and humanely.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

938 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1072.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1072–74.
Id. at 1073.
See id. at 1073–74.
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1076.
See id. at 1080.
Id. at 1079.
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This Recent Development discusses the Ninth Circuit’s inconsistent
rationale of finding First Amendment support for the public to have access to
the auditory portion of executions yet finding no support for a right of access
to execution-related information. Allowing access to information about lethal
injection drugs and the executioners who administer them ensures that “lethal
injections are fairly and humanely administered,”21 even more so than access to
the auditory information recognized by the Ninth Circuit. This Recent
Development proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses executions and the main
concerns surrounding the lethal injection process. Part II discusses First
Amendment right of access jurisprudence and the relevant analytical framework
for right of access cases. Specifically, Part II discusses in more detail the history
and logic test as applied to judicial documents and prisoner executions. Part III
outlines the Ninth Circuit’s approach to the history and logic test in three
different cases, beginning with California First Amendment Coalition v.
Woodford,22 followed by Wood v. Ryan,23 and ending with the case in question,
First Amendment Coalition of Arizona, Inc. v. Ryan. Finally, Part IV discusses the
implications of the Ryan decision and the Ninth Circuit’s error in failing to
recognize a right of access to execution-related information.
I. EXECUTIONS, LETHAL INJECTIONS, AND UNQUALIFIED EXECUTIONERS
In 1977, Oklahoma became the first state to adopt lethal injection as a
method of execution.24 In 1982, Texas was the first state to actually execute one
of its prisoners using lethal injection.25 Since then, 1,352 people have been
executed via lethal injection and it remains the preferred method of execution
throughout the country.26 Execution via lethal injection usually consists of the
administration of a three-drug cocktail through intravenous lines: (1) an
anesthetic to sedate the prisoner; (2) a paralytic to paralyze the prisoner; and
(3) a drug to stop the heart.27 In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld this
three-drug protocol as constitutional.28 However, Wood’s botched execution
21. Id. at 1076.
22. 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
23. 759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.), vacated, 573 U.S. 976 (2014).
24. The History of the Death Penalty: A Timeline, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/history-of-the-death-penalty-timeline [https://perma.cc/S2SZT2Z5]; see also Pickert, supra note 2.
25. Pickert, supra note 2.
26. Methods
of
Execution,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/methods-of-execution [https://perma.cc/797D-EKFT].
27. Jeffrey E. Stern, The Cruel and Unusual Execution of Clayton Lockett, ATLANTIC (June
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/execution-clayton-lockett/392069/
[https://perma.cc/4668-A3D8 (dark archive)].
28. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (“[P]etitioners have not carried their burden of
showing that the risk of pain from maladministration of a concededly humane lethal injection protocol,
and the failure to adopt untried and untested alternatives, constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”).
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fueled already-existing concerns about lethal injection as a method of
execution.29 The lethal injection process has three main concerns: (1) the
adequacy of the three-drug lethal injection protocol; (2) the process through
which drugs are obtained; and (3) the qualifications of those who administer
execution drugs.30 Each concern will be addressed in turn.
A.

Adequacy of the Three-Drug Protocol for Lethal Injections

The first concern with executions via lethal injection is the ability of the
three-drug protocol to deliver a painless, humane death.31 One objection to this
three-drug protocol is that the paralytic administered to prisoners can conceal
an individual’s pain or suffering from execution witnesses.32 The first drug
administered in the three-drug cocktail may also be problematic. An analysis by
National Public Radio (“NPR”) of more than 200 autopsies found that eightyfour percent of inmates who were executed via lethal injection showed signs of
pulmonary edema—a mixture of blood, plasma, and other fluids in the lungs
that can “induce the feeling of suffocation or drowning.”33 The autopsies also
showed the presence of “frothy fluid” in the lower airways, indicating additional
problems with the lethal injection process.34
First, the presence of the frothy liquid suggests that inmates were still
alive when their lungs filled with fluid—as froth can only form if the inmate is
still breathing.35 Second, the frothy liquid in the lungs can only be a result of
the anesthetic administered (the first drug in the three-drug cocktail), because
the second drug, the paralytic, stops the lungs from working.36 Additionally, the
dosage of the anesthetic may be responsible for causing this pulmonary edema,
considering an excessive dosage of drugs—especially when administered in a
short amount of time—can damage the lungs.37 As this reporting demonstrates,
there are serious concerns that the anesthetics administered in lethal injections
are not fully anesthetizing inmates and are subjecting them to sensations of
29. See Dart, supra note 4.
30. See id.
31. See Pickert, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
32. See Bedau, supra note 2; see also Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The
Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 66 (2002) (“In an effort to present a medically sterile aura of peace, for example,
executioners inject paralyzing drugs that serve no other purpose than to still a prisoner who, in reality,
may be experiencing the hideous pains of dying but may not be able to express it.”).
33. Noah Caldwell, Ailsa Chang & Jolie Myers, Gasping for Air: Autopsies Reveal Troubling Effects
of Lethal Injection, NPR (Sept. 21, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/
09/21/793177589/gasping-for-air-autopsies-reveal-troubling-effects-of-lethal-injection [https://perma
.cc/64KV-H2WR].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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“suffocating and drowning” induced by pulmonary edema.38 This is problematic
because, as public defender Allen Bohnert told NPR, “[w]e can’t ask the
[inmate] what is happening to them during the course of their execution.”39 Full
transparency into the lethal injection protocol is therefore necessary to
determine whether lethal injection remains a suitable and humane process of
execution.
B.

Secrecy Surrounding the Acquisition of Lethal Injection Drugs

In addition to concerns about the efficacy of execution drugs, the second
objection to execution procedures is the secrecy surrounding the acquisition of
lethal injection drugs. Strict federal and international regulations make lethal
injection drugs difficult to obtain,40 and states have taken unorthodox and
desperate measures to import execution drugs.41 A massive drug shortage in the
United States, as well as the medical profession’s ethical hesitancy to participate
in executions, has driven correction facilities to use inferior methods in
executions and substandard providers to acquire lethal injection drugs.42 Some
states have resorted to “illegally importing the drugs, using untested
combinations, or buying from unregulated compounding pharmacies, a number
of which have a history of producing contaminated products.”43 The use of
compounding pharmacies is especially concerning because compounding
pharmacies do not go through the same process of approval as large

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ADDENDUM TO BOP EXECUTION
PROTOCOL, FEDERAL DEATH SENTENCE IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES (July 1, 2007),
https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/BOP%20Protocol%208-1-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MJ6Q-6GY9]. For example, in previous years, both the U.S. Government and other
state protocols required the administration of a three-drug injection beginning with sodium
thiopental. See, e.g., TENN. DEP’T OF CORR., EXECUTION PROCEDURES FOR LETHAL
INJECTION 35, 44 (2007), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/TENNlethinjec.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9D2-PE6M]. However, in 2009, the sole U.S. manufacturer of sodium thiopental
ended its production of the drug, making it impossible for states to acquire it from domestic suppliers.
Nathan Koppel, Drug Halt Hinders Executions in the U.S., WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2011, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704754304576095980790129692 [https://perma.cc/
RKH6-NNG6 (dark archive)].
41. John Schwartz, Seeking Execution Drug, States Cut Legal Corners, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/us/14lethal.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/3J2T
-DWB2 (dark archive)].
42. See Deng & Lithwick, supra note 2.
43. Stephanie Mencimer, Does This Secret Drug Cocktail Work To Execute People? Oklahom Will Find
Out Tonight., MOTHER JONES (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/
double-execution-tonight-ok-using-secret-experimental-drug-protocol/
[https://perma.cc/3YJULH7R]; see also ROBIN KONRAD, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR, BEHIND THE CURTAIN: SECRECY
AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 35–41 (Robert Dunham & Ngozi Ndulue eds.),
https://documents.deathpenaltyinfo.org/pdf/SecrecyReport-2.f1560295685.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
T4B6-KGSF] (detailing states’ unorthodox practices of obtaining lethal injection drugs).
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pharmaceutical companies do, leaving the safety and efficacy of their products
uncertain.44
Some argue that the lack of transparency surrounding drug manufacturers
can impede legal challenges to executions.45 If a defendant is not allowed to
know the source and manufacturer of the drugs, they cannot ensure the quality
of the drugs or the qualifications of the pharmacist who made them.46 The
quality of the drugs, including their manufacturer, can indicate whether they
are suitable for lethal injections and is therefore a material piece of information
to determine whether lethal injections are being administered fairly and
humanely.
C.

Qualification of Executioners

The third questionable aspect of lethal injection procedures includes the
qualifications of execution team members. As Professor Deborah Denno points
out, “[l]egislatures delegate death to prison personnel and executioners who are
not qualified to devise a lethal injection protocol, much less carry one out.”47
Often, lethal injections are administered by prison staff with little medical
expertise and only some paramedic training.48 This is partly due to the fact that
many of the people who are medically trained to administer injections
intravenously, such as doctors and nurses, are unwilling to carry out
executions.49 Some qualified individuals, such as anesthesiologists, can have
their license revoked if they participate in lethal injections.50
Although some prison regulations require executioners to have some
training or preparation to act as executioners, the extent to which each
44. Compounding Pharmacies and Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/lethal-injection/compounding-pharmacies [https://perma.cc/
VVE8-WQDU].
45. Tracy Connor, Will Courts Lift Veil of Secrecy Around Lethal Injections?, NBC NEWS (Feb. 27,
2014, 9:30 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/lethal-injection/will-courts-lift-veil-secrecyaround-lethal-injections-n40171 [https://perma.cc/KK2X-S2EK] (last updated Feb. 28, 2014, 10:37
PM).
46. An investigative report revealed that Texas secretly bought its lethal injection drugs from a
compounding pharmacy that had been previously cited forty-eight times for dangerous practices. Chris
McDaniel, Inmates Said the Drug Burned As They Died. This Is How Texas Gets Its Execution Drugs.,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018, 5:09 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/amphtml/
chrismcdaniel/inmates-said-the-drug-burned-as-they-died-this-is-how-texas?__twitter_impression=
true [https://perma.cc/NA37-FMSA].
47. See Denno, supra note 32, at 66.
48. Owen Dyer, The Slow Death of Lethal Injection, 348 BMJ 16, 17 (2014).
49. Denno, supra note 32, at 66.
50. See Rob Stein, Group To Censure Physicians Who Play Role in Lethal Injections,
WASH. POST (May 2, 2010), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/01/
AR2010050103190.html [https://perma.cc/AV8F-6KFW (dark archive)] (noting the American Board
of Anesthesiologists decided to revoke certification of any member who participates in an execution by
lethal injection).
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department of correction offers that training or ensures that executioners are
qualified is unclear.51 This can generate serious complications during the
execution.52 For example, some inmates have collapsed veins due to drug use or
poor health, which can make it especially hard for an untrained person to find
a vein.53 Additionally, if the injection is mistakenly inserted into tissue instead
of a vein, the injection drugs will not be administered effectively.54 And, if the
intravenous line is placed incorrectly, it can slip out during the execution.55 It is
thus essential to verify the qualification of executioners because any pain
suffered by the inmate should not be the result of human error.
Since 2011, thirteen states have passed “secrecy statutes” that conceal
information about the execution process, thereby exacerbating the problem of a
lack of information surrounding lethal injections.56 Arizona is one of those
states, prohibiting disclosure of the identity of executioners or any identifying
information in their records.57 Similarly, Indiana prohibits disclosure of the
identity of “a pharmacist, a pharmacy, a wholesale drug distributor, or an
outsourcing facility” that contracts with the department of corrections to issue
lethal injection drugs.58 These statutes enable states to continue to follow
unorthodox practices, to acquire drugs from second-rate suppliers, and to hire
unqualified executioners.59
The secrecy surrounding information on both lethal injection drugs and
the lack of qualification of executioners impedes the public’s ability to ensure
executions are administered fairly, safely, and legally. Disclosing the drugs’
manufacturers, sellers, lot numbers, NDCs, and expiration dates—in addition
to personnel qualifications—allows the public to closely scrutinize whether
states are legally obtaining and adequately administering lethal injection drugs.
51. See Denno, supra note 32, at 121.
52. The execution of Clayton Lockett, an Oklahoma inmate, was partly botched by a prison staff’s
failure to find a vein. Katie Fretland & Jessica Glenza, Oklahoma State Report on Botched
Lethal Injection Cites Medical Failures, GUARDIAN (Sept. 4, 2014, 11:17 PM), https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2014/sep/04/oklahoma-inquiry-botched-lethal-injection-clayton-lockett [https://perma.cc
/J42T-RA2P] (last updated Sept. 4, 4:47 PM). A state investigation into the execution revealed that a
paramedic attempted to insert a needle into Lockett, but failed to secure it with tape and the vein
became unviable. Id. There were two more failed attempts at finding a vein by prison staff before a
physician was called. Id. The physician was able to insert the injection into a vein in Lockett’s groin
but covered the area with a sheet for privacy. Id. The sheet made the intravenous line insertion invisible
to executioners, which ultimately concealed complications with the injection for several minutes. Id.
53. See Caldwell et al., supra note 33.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. See KONRAD, supra note 43, at 4.
57. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(d) (Westlaw through the 1st Spec. Sess. of the 55th Leg.
2021). Arizona Senate Bill 1695 was introduced into the Arizona legislature on February 1, 2021, and
if passed, would repeal section 13-757(d). S.B. 1695, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021).
58. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-6-1(e)–(f) (Westlaw through all legislation of the 2021 1st Reg.
Sess. of the 122d Gen. Assemb.).
59. See KONRAD, supra note 43, at 69.
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This Recent Development therefore argues that a First Amendment right of
access to specific information about execution drugs and the qualifications of
executioners should not only be recognized by the courts but is necessary to the
equitable administration of justice.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS JURISPRUDENCE
While states can bar certain information from disclosure, the public may
still have the right to receive that information under the free speech clause of
the First Amendment.60 The Supreme Court has recognized a First
Amendment “right of access” to government proceedings through a series of
decisions that first upheld a constitutional right of access to criminal trials and
subsequently upheld a right of access to preliminary hearings and jury
selection.61
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,62 the Supreme Court recognized
a First Amendment right of public access to criminal trials because “historical
evidence demonstrates conclusively that . . . criminal trials . . . had long been
presumptively open” to the public.63 To overcome the presumption of openness,
the state must prove an overriding interest to justify exclusion.64 In Globe
Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court,65 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in
Richmond Newspapers, holding that the First Amendment recognizes a right of
access to a criminal trial because it “historically has been open to the press and
general public”66 and “access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant
role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole.”67
This framework has come to be known as the “history and logic test.”68
60. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1980) (“The First
Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth, prohibits governments from ‘abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.’ These expressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government. . . . Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen.”).
61. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (recognizing
a public right of access to preliminary hearings); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. (Press-Enterprise I),
464 U.S. 501, 505–10 (1984) (recognizing a public right of access to jury selection); Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982) (reinforcing the holding in Richmond Newspapers);
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575–77 (recognizing a right of access to criminal trials); Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393–94 (1979) (recognizing a defendant’s right to a public trial, but not
necessarily a public right of access to the court).
62. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
63. Id. at 569.
64. See id. at 580–81.
65. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
66. Id. at 605.
67. Id. at 606.
68. See id. at 606; cf. Raleigh Hannah Levine, Toward a New Public Access Doctrine, 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2006) (referring to the test as the “‘experience and logic’ or ‘history and function’
pre-test”).
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In 1984, the Supreme Court recognized that the public’s access to criminal
proceedings is essential to the equitable administration of justice:
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending
trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed;
the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that
established procedures are being followed and that deviations will
become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public
confidence in the system.69
The Supreme Court later recognized this same value in a right of public access
to jury selection70 and preliminary hearings.71
A.

The History and Logic Test

The main legal framework through which right of access cases are analyzed
is best known as the history and logic test. The history prong asks whether the
government proceeding has “historically . . . been open to the press and general
public.”72 The logic prong asks whether access to the government proceeding
“plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process
and the government as a whole.”73 In the context of criminal trials, the Supreme
Court has reiterated that public access “permits the public to participate in and
serve as a check upon the judicial process—an essential component in our
structure of self-government.”74
The right of access, however, is not absolute.75 “If the particular proceeding
in question passes these tests of experience and logic, a qualified First
Amendment right of public access attaches.”76 However, the right can be
overcome “by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential
to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”77

69. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508.
70. Id. at 505–10.
71. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10.
72. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605.
73. Id. at 606.
74. Id.
75. Some have advocated for a different framework through which to analyze right of access cases,
but since the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled the history and logic test and many lower
courts still use it, this Recent Development follows the history and logic test for analyzing the right of
access to executions and related documents. See generally David S. Ardia, Court Transparency and the
First Amendment, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 835, 836 (2017) (advocating for a legal framework that focuses
on “whether the structural benefits of court transparency are outweighed by the need for secrecy” rather
than focusing on the history and logic of openness); Levine, supra note 68, at 1760 (noting “most lower
courts have taken one of three different approaches to claims of an access right”).
76. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
77. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
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Subsequent Applications of the History and Logic Test

While the Supreme Court recognized a right of access to preliminary
hearings, it has not explicitly extended the history and logic test to other judicial
proceedings.78 Rather, the Court has left the task of applying the law to the
lower courts, leaving the boundaries of the test unclear. The qualified right of
access to criminal trials is solidified in Supreme Court jurisprudence, and most
lower courts recognize a qualified right of access to civil trials.79 However, lower
courts disagree as to whether court documents receive the same right of access
as the proceedings to which they are related.80
Lower courts have usually approached right of access claims to judicial
documents in one of three ways.81 The first approach disregards the history and
logic test altogether and applies a “closure validity test”—a test that is based on
common law and is easier to satisfy than strict scrutiny.82 This approach bases
its reasoning on the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc.,83 where the Court held that the press has a First
Amendment right to physical copies of tapes played during a trial.84 In its
decision, the Supreme Court recognized a common-law right of access to all
judicial records, articulating that “the decision as to access is one best left to the
sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the
relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.”85 Thus, more documents
are presumptively available under Nixon than under the other approaches.86
However, Nixon’s presumption of openness is more easily overcome because of
the test’s wide discretion reserved to judges and the lower standard judges must
meet to overcome a common-law right, versus a constitutional one.87
78. See Ardia, supra note 75, at 855–56 (“Since Press-Enterprise I and II, the Supreme Court has
not revisited its conclusion that the First Amendment provides a qualified right of access to criminal
trials and trial-like proceedings, nor has the Court had occasion to resolve whether the experience and
logic test mandates a right of access to other judicial activities, including civil proceedings and court
records.”).
79. See Levine, supra note 68, at 1759 n.123.
80. Ardia, supra note 75, at 858–59 (“Courts also appear uncertain whether the experience and
logic test is applicable in situations that do not closely resemble the settings in which the test arose. . . .
Indecision about the scope of a First Amendment right of access is most acute in cases involving public
access to pre-trial civil proceedings, court records, and administrative hearings . . . .”).
81. Id. Compare Howard v. State, 291 P.3d 137, 142 (Nev. 2012) (applying a common-law test for
access to records), and United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86–87 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying the history
and logic test to the proceeding in order to determine a right of access to documents related to that
proceeding), with United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228–29 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying the history
and logic test directly to documents).
82. See Levine, supra note 68, at 1760.
83. 435 U.S. 589 (1978)
84. See id. at 608–11.
85. Id. at 597–99.
86. Levine, supra note 68, at 1761.
87. See id. at 1761–62; see also Ardia, supra note 75, at 871–72 (“Whereas the First Amendment
requires that restrictions on access must be necessary to serve a compelling interest and be narrowly
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Unlike the first approach, the second and third approaches recognize
access as a First Amendment constitutional right and apply the history and logic
test.88 The second approach recognizes a right to access documents filed in a
proceeding if the proceeding itself has given rise to a right of access under the
First Amendment.89 The third approach does not focus on the proceeding to
which the document is related, but applies the history and logic test to the
documents themselves in order to determine whether a right of access
attaches.90 These latter two approaches follow the Supreme Court’s application
of the history and logic test in Richmond Newspapers and subsequent cases.91
Some courts follow a combination of these two approaches.92
Whether a document related to a proceeding is available to the public
depends on which approach the court chooses to apply. The Richmond
Newspapers line of cases—recognizing a constitutional right of access to criminal
proceedings—was decided after the decision in Nixon recognized a common-law
right of access to judicial records.93 However, there is no indication that
Richmond Newspapers overruled Nixon’s recognition of a common-law right of
access in exchange for a constitutional one. Thus, some courts still choose to
follow the Nixon approach.94
C.

The History and Logic Test as Applied to Prisons and Executions

Although courts have recognized a First Amendment right of access for
the public to witness prisoner executions,95 the Supreme Court has not
recognized a right of broad public access to prisons. In Pell v. Procunier,96 the
Supreme Court recognized that “the conditions in this Nation’s prisons are a
matter that is both newsworthy and of great public importance.”97 Still, the
Court concluded that “[t]he Constitution does not . . . require government to
accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the
public generally.”98 Four years later, the Court reached a similar conclusion in

tailored to serve that interest, a judge need only find under the common law that the interests in closure
outweigh the interests in access.”).
88. See Levine, supra note 68, at 1760.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 1761. For a brief discussion of Richmond Newspapers and subsequent cases, see supra
Part II.
92. Id. at 1764.
93. Ardia, supra note 75, at 872.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1982) (“We recognize . . .
that the right here in question is of non-constitutional origin.”).
95. See, e.g., Cal. First Amend. Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 2002).
96. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
97. Id. at 830 n.7.
98. Id. at 834.
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Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,99 noting that “members of the press are accorded
substantial access to the federal prisons in order to observe and report the
conditions they find there.”100 Nonetheless, the Court ultimately held that
prison regulations prohibiting the press from interviewing individually
designated inmates did not violate the First Amendment.101 Similarly, in
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,102 the Court held that the news media did not have a
right of access to interview inmates at a county jail.103 Although the Court noted
that the press acts as the “eyes and ears”104 of the public and “can be a powerful
and constructive force”105 in remedying public injustice, it concluded that the
Court has “never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of access
to all sources of information within government control.”106
Although the abovementioned Supreme Court cases failed to recognize a
right of the press to have broad access to inmates, this line of jurisprudence did
not invalidate a First Amendment right of access to prisons. In 1998, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court failed to recognize a right of access in
Houchins, Saxbe, and Pell because, in those cases, the press was seeking access
superior to that afforded to the public.107 Thus, the Supreme Court recognized
limitations on the public and press’s access to prisons. The Supreme Court did
not totally deny the press access inside prison walls; it held “only that such a
right is co-extensive with the public’s right to the same information.”108 In 2002,
the Ninth Circuit recognized a First Amendment right of access to view
executions, concluding there was both a historical tradition of public access to
executions and that public access to executions “plays a significant positive role”
in the functioning of capital punishment.109
D.

Other Circuits’ Approach to Right of Access to Execution-Related Information

As this section explains, the Supreme Court’s reluctance to recognize a
constitutional right for the press to access prisons has influenced some circuit
courts to deny a right of access to execution-related information. Relying
mainly on the Supreme Court’s decision in Houchins, which held that the news
media did not have a right of access to interview inmates at a county jail,110 the
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

417 U.S. 843 (1974).
Id. at 847.
See id. at 850.
438 U.S. 1 (1978).
See id. at 15–16.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Cal. First Amend. Coal. v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Cal. First Amend. Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 875–77 (9th Cir. 2002).
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1978).
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Sixth Circuit in Phillips v. DeWine111 held that the First Amendment does not
compel disclosure of information regarding the identities of execution team
members nor the identities of entities that transport, manufacture, compound,
or supply lethal injection drugs.112 Although the Sixth Circuit recognized that
the history and logic test has been applied in broad contexts outside of criminal
trials, it ultimately concluded that “it does not follow that [the right of access]
covers all information related to [a] proceeding.”113 The court noted that
information relating to the lethal injection process and individuals participating
in it was “neither information of the type filed in a government proceeding nor
its functional equivalent” and was thus not covered by the right of access
doctrine.114
In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit in Wellons v. Commissioner, Georgia
Department of Corrections115 noted that the First Amendment did not give
individuals “the broad right” to know the manufacturer of lethal injection drugs
and the qualifications of those who administer them.116 Relevant to the Eleventh
Circuit’s conclusion was the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Pell
denying press access to inmates focused “on the public’s, rather than the
individual’s, need to be informed so as to foster debate.”117 Thus, the individual
plaintiff did not have a First Amendment right of access to information about
lethal injection drugs and the qualification of his executioners.118
In 2015, the Eighth Circuit in Zink v. Lombardi119 explicitly distinguished
itself from the Ninth Circuit, which has recognized a First Amendment right
of access to view executions.120 The Eighth Circuit discussed the history and
logic test “for the sake of analysis,”121 but concluded that there was not enough
evidence that “the particulars” of executions have historically been open to the
public or that specific information about execution procedures played a
significant enough role to justify openness.122
These cases showcase a pattern of circuit courts denying the public the
right to access information regarding the source and manufacturer of lethal
injection drugs and the qualifications of executioners. As discussed in Part III
of this Recent Development, the Ninth Circuit relied on these three opinions—
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

841 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2016).
See id. at 417–20.
Id. at 418–19.
Id. at 419.
754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1267 (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996)).
Id. at 1266 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 831 (1974)).
Id. at 1266–67.
783 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1112; see also Cal. First Amend. Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 2002).
Zink, 783 F.3d at 1112.
Id. at 1112–13.
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DeWine, Wellons, and Zink—from sister circuits when it refused to find a
qualified right of access to execution-related information.123
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH
Although the Ninth Circuit has recognized a public right of access to plea
agreements,124 documents filed in pretrial proceedings,125 and documents filed
in post-conviction proceedings,126 it declined to extend this right of access to
documents related to prisoner executions in the 2019 case First Amendment
Coalition of Arizona, Inc. v. Ryan.127 In Ryan, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
information related to executions, such as information about lethal injection
drugs and personnel, “bears no resemblance” to other information to which the
public generally has access128—even though the court emphasized that access to
executions plays a significant role in ensuring executions are done “fairly and
humanely.”129
The Ninth Circuit heavily relied on its 2002 decision in California First
Amendment Coalition v. Woodford to reach its holding in Ryan.130 Thus, this
Recent Development discusses the holding and reasoning of Woodford in more
detail to better contextualize the decision in Ryan.
A.

California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford

In 2002, the Ninth Circuit held that the public has a First Amendment
right of access to view executions, starting from the moment the prisoner is
escorted into the execution chamber.131 In the case of Woodford, plaintiffs
challenged San Quentin State Prison’s Institutional Procedure 770 (“Procedure
770”), which prohibited witnesses from observing a prisoner’s execution until
after the prisoner had been strapped to a gurney, intravenous lines had been
inserted, and the execution team exited the chamber.132 The court applied a
balancing test between “the State’s ability to carry out executions in a safe and
orderly manner and the public’s right to be informed about how the State and
its justice system implement the most serious punishment a state can exact from
a criminal defendant—the penalty of death.”133
123. First Amend. Coal. of Ariz., Inc. v. Ryan, 938 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Other courts
have reached the same conclusion.”).
124. Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 920 F.2d 1462, 1465–66 (9th Cir. 1990).
125. Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983).
126. CBS, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 765 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985).
127. Ryan, 938 F.3d at 1078–79.
128. Id. at 1079.
129. Id. at 1076.
130. Id. at 1075 (“Our conclusion follows directly from the holding and reasoning of Woodford.”).
131. Cal. First Amend. Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 885–86 (9th Cir. 2002).
132. Id. at 870–71.
133. Id. at 873.
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In considering whether the public had a right to watch executions in their
entirety, the Ninth Circuit applied the history and logic test.134 Because “[t]he
public and press historically have been allowed to watch the condemned inmate
enter the execution place, be attached to the execution device and then die,” the
court concluded “historical tradition strongly support[ed]” the right to view the
initial procedures of an execution in addition to the execution itself.135 In
concluding that the logic prong of the test was satisfied, the court reasoned that
“[i]ndependent public scrutiny . . . plays a significant role in the proper
functioning of capital punishment” in order to “determine whether lethal
injection executions are fairly and humanely administered.”136
Instead of analyzing the state’s interest with a level of scrutiny similar to
that used in right of access cases, the Ninth Circuit applied a level of scrutiny
applicable to constitutional challenges to prison regulations: “whether the
regulation ‘is “reasonably related” to legitimate penological objectives, or
whether it represents an “exaggerated response” to those concerns.’”137 Because
the court concluded that Procedure 770 was not reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest and constituted an “exaggerated response,” the
state’s interest was insufficient to justify a restriction on the public’s First
Amendment right of access to view executions in their entirety.138
B.

Wood v. Ryan

In July of 2014, the Ninth Circuit stayed the execution of Joseph Wood
four days before he was scheduled to die.139 Three months prior, Arizona sought
a warrant of Wood’s execution based on a double homicide charge.140 In the
process, the state notified Wood’s attorney that the ADC planned to use a twodrug cocktail in Wood’s lethal injection, but reserved the right to use a third
drug if it became available.141 The head of Arizona’s Federal Public Defender’s
134. See id. at 875.
135. Id. at 876.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 877–79 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987)) (“Because the executions at
issue here take place within prison walls, are administered by the same individuals who run San
Quentin and are staffed by the same personnel who participate in the daily operations of the prison,
our level of scrutiny must be guided by the line of cases addressing constitutional challenges to prison
regulations, rather than by those governing access to governmental proceedings.”).
138. Id. at 885–86.
139. Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1077–78 (9th Cir.) (staying Wood’s execution on July 19, 2014,
when his execution was scheduled for July 23, 2014), vacated, 573 U.S. 976 (2014).
140. See id. at 1078.
141. Id. The ADC notified Wood’s attorney that it planned to use the drugs midazolam and
hydromorphone to execute Wood, but that if they were able to obtain the drug pentobarbital, the ADC
would notify Wood’s attorney of “its intent to use that drug.” Id. Midazolam is a drug commonly used
in lethal injection executions. See Caldwell et al., supra note 33. The State of Ohio used a combination
of midazolam and hydromorphone to execute Dennis McGuire, resulting in McGuire “pant[ing] for
air and writh[ing] for 10 minutes.” Dyer, supra note 48, at 16–17.
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Capital Habeas Unit, Dale Baich, requested information from the ADC
regarding the dosage of the drugs to be used; the name, manufacturer, and
source of the drugs; and the credentials of those administering the lethal
injection.142 The ADC responded that it would follow the suggested dosage
from Arizona’s execution protocol, and said that the drugs were both
“domestically obtained,” and FDA-approved.143 Citing Arizona’s
confidentiality law,144 the ADC rejected the request to release any identifying
information regarding the execution team.145 Baich again requested information
about the drug manufacturers, lot numbers, expiration dates, and qualifications
of the execution team.146 The ADC provided redacted records including some
purchasing information and expiration dates, but excluded the drug’s
manufacturers and suppliers.147
In response to the ADC’s partial disclosure, Wood sought to enjoin his
execution until receiving information regarding (1) the source, manufacturer,
NDCs, and lot numbers of the drugs to be used in his execution; (2) “non
personally identifying information” relating to the qualifications of execution
team members; and (3) “information and documents explaining how the
Department developed its current lethal injection drug protocol.”148
Citing Woodford, the Ninth Circuit noted that lethal injections are
“invasive, possibly painful and may give rise to serious complications.”149 In
order to judge whether this method of execution is humane and fair, the public
must have reliable information about the “initial procedures that are
inextricably intertwined” with an execution.150 The court recognized that, in the
Ninth Circuit, the right of access is not limited to court proceedings—it has also
been extended to “documents related to those proceedings” in which the court
has recognized a right of access.151
Because the information Wood sought is “inextricably intertwined with
the execution,” the court focused its analysis on the “historic openness of the
142. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1078.
143. Id.; see id. at 1088–89 n.1 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (“The current execution protocol, found in
Department Order 710, calls for the use of 50 mg of midazolam and 50 mg of hydromorphone.”). The
Wood opinion notes that the ADC indicated that it would use the two-drug protocol on Wood and that
it had chosen the dosages of both drugs based on sworn testimony in “the Ohio Execution Protocol
litigation.” Id. at 1078.
144. Id. at 1078. This statute makes the “identity of executioners and other persons who participate
or perform ancillary functions in an execution and any information contained in those records that
would identify those persons . . . confidential” and therefore not subject to disclosure. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-757(d) (Westlaw through the 1st Spec. Sess. of the 55th Leg. 2021).
145. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1078.
146. Id. at 1079.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1081 (quoting Cal. First Amend Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002)).
150. Id. (quoting Woodford, F.3d at 877).
151. Id. (citing Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 920 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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execution itself,” rather than the information sought after.152 They relied on the
analysis in Woodford, reaffirming that executions have been historically open to
the public.153 The court also found sufficient evidence that “important details
about early methods of executions” were also open to the public, such as the
type and manufacturers of ropes used in hangings, the identities of individuals
who handled cyanide used in gas chambers, and specific details about electric
chairs.154 Since Wood was seeking a preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit
was not required to determine whether this evidence was conclusive.155 Instead,
it was enough that the evidence raised “serious questions” as to whether the
information sought after had historically been open.156
As to the logic prong, the court concluded that “more information about
the drugs used in lethal injections can help an alert public make better informed
decisions about the changing standards of decency in this country surrounding
lethal injection.”157 Additionally, specific information about the drugs—such as
its source, manufacturer, lot numbers, and NDCs—are indicative of whether
state corrections departments are acquiring the drugs from “safe and reliable
drug manufacturers.”158 Finally, knowing whether execution team members are
qualified to perform executions gives the public “more confidence than a state’s
generic assurance that executions will be administered safely and pursuant to
certain qualifications and standards.”159
Based on the analysis above, the Ninth Circuit granted a conditional stay
to Wood’s execution.160 Three days later, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the
Ninth Circuit’s judgment, issuing a three-sentence opinion concluding that the
district court judge was within his discretion to deny Wood’s motion for a
preliminary injunction.161 Wood was executed the next day.162
C.

First Amendment Coalition of Arizona, Inc. v. Ryan

The Ninth Circuit had a second chance to evaluate the First Amendment
right of access to executions and execution-related information in First
Amendment Coalition of Arizona, Inc. v. Ryan.163 Applying its reasoning from
Woodford, the Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment right of access to
152. Id. at 1083.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1083–84 (noting the details about ropes, gas chambers, and electric chairs were open to
the public).
155. Id. at 1084.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1085.
158. Id. at 1086.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1088.
161. Ryan v. Wood, 573 U.S. 976, 976–77 (2014).
162. First Amend. Coal. of Ariz., Inc. v. Ryan, 938 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2019).
163. See id.
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watch executions in their entirety also encompasses the right to listen to the
execution in its entirety.164 However, that same access right does not encompass
a right to access information regarding the lethal injection drugs used during
the execution or the execution team’s qualifications.165 This Recent
Development discusses each holding separately.
1. Right To Hear the Execution
The first of the plaintiffs’ challenges consisted of the constitutionality of
the ADC’s restriction on the ability of witnesses to hear an execution in its
entirety.166 Under the ADC’s procedures, the public was able to view the entire
execution but the overhead microphone responsible for transmitting sounds
from the execution room was turned off after the insertion of intravenous lines.
In other words, the public could watch the execution, but could not hear any
sounds as the prisoner died.167 Extending its previous analysis of the public right
to view executions, the court here reasoned that “[t]he historical tradition of
public access described in Woodford includes the ability to hear the sounds of
executions” because, historically, witnesses “could, no doubt, hear the sounds of
the entire execution process.”168 In analyzing the logic prong of letting the
public hear executions, the court borrowed from Woodford again and reasoned
that “[e]xecution witnesses need to be able to observe and report on the entire
process so that the public can determine whether lethal injections are fairly and
humanely administered.”169 Thus, restricting witnesses from the sounds of an
execution deprives the public from the auditory information regarding the
lethal injection and “the prisoner’s experience as he dies.”170
After finding a constitutional right of the public to hear an execution in
its entirety, the Ninth Circuit reviewed ADC’s procedures through the same
“deferential standard” it used in Woodford—whether the regulation was
“reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives or whether it
represent[ed] an exaggerated response to those concerns.”171 The court applied
four factors from Turner v. Safley172 that are relevant in analyzing whether a
restriction is reasonable:
(1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to
164. Id. at 1075.
165. Id. at 1080.
166. Id. at 1072.
167. Id. at 1073.
168. Id. at 1075.
169. Id. at 1076.
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Cal. First Amend. Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987))).
172. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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justify it,” (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the
right that remain open to prison inmates,” (3) what “impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards
and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally,”
and (4) whether there are “obvious, easy alternatives . . . that fully
accommodate[] the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid
penological interests.”173
Addressing these four factors, the court concluded that there was no “valid,
rational connection” between the regulation—prohibiting the sounds of only
parts of the execution—and the government interest—protecting the identity
of executioners and decreasing the risk of litigation.174 There was also no
alternative means to exercise the right to hear the execution in its entirety.175
Additionally, the alternative of keeping the microphone on at the time of
execution would have little to no impact on guards, inmates, or prison
resources.176 Thus, ADC’s restriction of the public’s First Amendment right to
hear executions was not justified.177
2. Right to Execution-Related Information
In a much shorter analysis and in a complete reversal from its reasoning
in Wood v. Ryan, the Ninth Circuit did not recognize an equal right of access to
execution-related information. The plaintiffs’ second and third claims
challenged the ADC’s failure to disclose information about lethal injection
drugs and the qualifications of executioners.178 The ADC did disclose some
drug-related information—including the chemical composition and dosages of
the drugs and the drug protocol to be used in an execution—but plaintiffs
sought additional information about the drugs’ manufacturers, sellers, lot
numbers, NDCs, and expiration dates.179 Additionally, ADC required that
execution team members be certified or licensed, but plaintiffs sought
documentation proving their qualifications.180
In its analysis, the court seemed to be more persuaded by the Houchins line
of cases, which generally held that the “First Amendment does not ‘mandate[]
a right of access to government information’”181 than the Richmond Newspapers

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Ryan, 938 F.3d at 1077 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1078.
Id. at 1076.
See id. at 1078–80.
Id. at 1073–74.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1079 (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
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line of cases, which recognized a public right of access to criminal trials.182
Distinguishing the information sought by plaintiffs in this case from other
documents in criminal proceedings to which the public generally has access, the
court found that neither the public nor the press had a right of access to the
sought after information relating to lethal injection drugs and the qualifications
of the execution team.183 The court reasoned that this kind of information does
not resemble a transcript of a criminal proceeding, nor does it resemble
documents that are a part of “the official judicial record.”184 The Ninth Circuit
also noted that Woodford’s recognition of a right to view executions does not
necessarily encompass the right to access the information regarding lethal
injection drugs and personnel qualifications.185 Since the court found that the
information sought after here differed “in material ways” from documents in
previous cases recognizing a right of access, it concluded that the public did not
have a right to access it.186 As discussed in more detail in Part IV, this decision
is inconsistent with precedent and First Amendment values.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE HISTORY AND
LOGIC TEST TO PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST OF INFORMATION AND FOUND A
QUALIFIED RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT PERSONNEL
QUALIFICATIONS AND THE SOURCE AND MANUFACTURER OF EXECUTION
DRUGS
A.

The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Relied on Other Circuits, Breaking with Its
Own Precedent

The Ninth Circuit placed too much weight on the decisions from its sister
circuits, in comparison to its own precedent, to guide its holding in Ryan.187
Although the Sixth Circuit identified that a First Amendment right of access
to a government proceeding does not necessarily presume a right of access to
all information related to that proceeding,188 its position should hardly be
persuasive here, especially considering the Ninth Circuit’s own precedent. The
182. Id. at 1078 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality
opinion)). Although the Ninth Circuit recognized the right of access jurisprudence set by Richmond
Newspapers and subsequent cases, it ultimately cites to Houchins to justify the denial of a right of access
to execution-related information. Id. at 1078–79.
183. Id. at 1078–79.
184. Id. at 1079.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1078.
187. See id. at 1080. The Ninth Circuit was persuaded by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Phillips,
the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Zink, and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Wellons. Id. (first citing
Phillips v. DeWine, 841 F.3d 405, 417–20 (6th Cir. 2016); then citing Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d
1089, 1111–13 (8th Cir. 2014); and then citing Wellons v. Comm’r, Ga. Dept. of Corr., 754 F.3d 1260,
1266–67 (11th Cir. 2014)).
188. See Phillips, 841 F.3d at 419.
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Ninth Circuit itself has recognized a right of access to documents reasonably
related to a government proceeding, such as plea agreements and documents
filed in pre- and post-conviction proceedings.189
In Ryan, the Ninth Circuit also cites to the Eighth Circuit to justify its
reasoning.190 But in Zink v. Lombardi, the Eighth Circuit explicitly differentiates
itself from the Ninth Circuit, noting that the Eighth Circuit never recognized
a qualified right of access to executions in the first place.191 Thus, the Eighth
Circuit declined to recognize a qualified right of access to documents related to
a proceeding that itself was not constitutionally required to be open.192
In addition to the Ninth Circuit’s misplaced reliance on other circuits, the
court brushed off its own precedent, having previously applied the history and
logic test to recognize a right of access to court documents. As previously
mentioned, the Ninth Circuit recognized a qualified right of access to “plea
agreements and related documents.”193 In another decision, the same Ninth
Circuit noted that “[t]here is no reason to distinguish pretrial proceedings and
the documents filed in regard to them. . . . [T]he public and press have a [F]irst
[A]mendment right of access to pretrial documents in general.”194 And in yet
another decision, the court reiterated that the values surrounding the First
Amendment right of access “apply with as much force to post conviction
proceedings as to the trial itself” and that the right of access “extends to
documents filed in [government] proceedings as well as in the trial itself.”195
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit quickly dismissed its previous analysis in
Wood v. Ryan, because the decision was “summarily vacated” by the Supreme
Court.196 Yet, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that having more information
about lethal injection drugs and personnel qualifications “would undoubtedly
aid the public and death-row inmates in monitoring the constitutionality of
Arizona’s execution proceedings.”197 But in complete contradiction to the First
Amendment value it recognized in Wood v. Ryan,198 the Ninth Circuit found the
189. See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
190. See Ryan, 938 F.3d at 1080 (citing Zink, 783 F.3d at 1111–13) (citing the Eighth Circuit’s
holding in Zink as persuasive authority).
191. See Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1112 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[U]nlike the Ninth Circuit, we
have not ruled that an execution constitutes the kind of criminal proceeding to which the public enjoys
a qualified right of access under the First Amendment.”).
192. Id. at 1112–13.
193. Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 920 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis
added).
194. Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983).
195. CBS, Inc., v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 765 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
196. First Amend. Coal. of Ariz., Inc. v. Ryan, 938 F.3d 1069,
1078 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.), vacated, 573 U.S. 976 (2014).
197. Ryan, 938 F.3d at 1080.
198. See Wood, 759 F.3d at 1082 (concluding that “the right [of] access to documents intrinsically
associated with public proceedings forms an important component of the . . . First Amendment right
of access”).

99 N.C. L. REV. 1587 (2021)

2021]

THE SOUND OF DEATH AND “SHROUD OF SECRECY”

1609

Supreme Court’s analysis-free order to be more persuasive, even though the
Court did not comment on the merits of the arguments.199
Applying the Ninth Circuit’s own precedent, executions and reasonably
related documents should be afforded analysis under the history and logic test.
The “primary justifications” for broad access to executions should “apply with
as much force” to information about lethal injection drugs and the personnel
administering them.200 As discussed in Part III, the court in Ryan recognized
that access to executions plays a significant role in ensuring that they are
performed fairly and humanely.201 This same justification applies to information
regarding the source and manufacturer of lethal injection drugs and the
qualifications of execution team members. As discussed in more detail below, a
right of access to this information also plays a significant role in public scrutiny
of lethal injections.
B.

The History and Logic Test Suggests Information Reasonably Related to
Executions Should Be Presumptively Open

Because the right of access attaches to the viewing and hearing of an
execution, it should also attach to documents closely related to that process.
This includes the information sought in Ryan, such as the source and
manufacturer of execution drugs to be used; lot numbers, NDCs, and expiration
dates of the drugs; and the qualifications of execution personnel. Regardless of
whether the history and logic test is applied to the execution itself or to the
documents being sought, the test would still support a presumption of right of
access.
As established by both Ryan and Woodford, there is a historical tradition of
public access to executions. Lethal injections have been administered since at
least 1982.202 However, long before lethal injections were the preferred method
of execution, members of the public were able to observe any method of
execution.203 In addition to witnessing executions, public records historically
revealed detailed information about ropes used in hangings, cyanide used in gas
chambers, and equipment used in electric chairs.204 Compared to other historical
methods of execution, scholars argue that more information is required to
understand lethal injections due to the method’s complex nature.205

199. See Wood, 573 U.S. at 976–77.
200. CBS, Inc., 765 F.2d at 825.
201. See supra Section III.B.
202. See Pickert, supra note 2.
203. Kelly A. Mennemeier, A Right to Know How You’ll Die: A First Amendment Challenge to State
Secrecy Statutes Regarding Lethal Injection Drugs, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 443, 473–74 (2017).
204. Id. at 474.
205. See id. at 475–76.
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Additionally, in 2008, the Supreme Court specifically considered the
constitutionality of the three-drug protocol used in lethal injections, detailing
in their opinion the exact drugs used in executions and their specific purpose in
the process.206 Not only did the Supreme Court closely scrutinize lethal
injection protocols in their opinion, but the Court also gave the public detailed
information about the drugs used in lethal injection executions.207 This only
strengthens the argument that at least some information about execution drugs
has been historically open and accessible to the public.
As to the logic prong, information about lethal injection drugs plays a
significant role in the equitable administration of justice because “the drugs and
drug combinations used in lethal injections affect the condemned prisoner’s
experience of dying to a much greater extent than other means of execution.”208
Although keeping the identity of drug manufacturers and other drug
information a secret could have some benefits,209 states have secretly engaged
in unorthodox and unsafe methods to acquire lethal injection drugs by acquiring
drugs internationally or from compounding pharmacies.210 The public can only
adequately evaluate executions if they know the when and the how of lethal
injections—“with what drugs, in what quantities and concentrations, and from
what sources.”211
Further, “[t]he efficacy of the drugs strongly impacts whether lethal
injection ‘comports with “the evolving standards of decency”’ that led our
society away from arguably less humane methods of execution.”212 Considering
the secrecy surrounding execution protocols213 and possibly illegal measures
states have taken to obtain lethal injection drugs,214 disclosing the drugs’
manufacturers, sellers, lot numbers, NDCs, and expiration dates—in addition
to personnel qualifications—would allow the public to closely scrutinize
whether states are legally obtaining and adequately administering lethal
injection drugs. Thus, having access to lethal injection drug information plays
206. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 44–45 (2008) (plurality opinion).
207. See id. at 44–46.
208. Mennemeier, supra note 203, at 475.
209. Heather Booth notes that “keeping the manufacturer of the execution drugs a secret could
facilitate obtaining the best possible drugs for the execution” because many manufacturers value
privacy. Heather Booth, Note, Better the Devil You Know: An Examination of Manufacturer Driven Lethal
Injection Drug Shortages, 2 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 395, 413 (2018).
210. See id.; see also Tom Dart, Secret America: How States Hide the Source of Their Lethal Injection
Drugs, GUARDIAN (May 15, 2014, 11:00), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2014/
may/15/-sp-secret-america-lethal-injection-drugs [perma.cc/HR3M-VN7W].
211. See Mennemeier, supra note 203, at 475–76.
212. See id. at 477 (quoting Cal. First Amend. Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir.
2002)).
213. See generally id. at 459–62 (detailing state secrecy statutes that shield information regarding
lethal injection drugs and those who administer them from disclosure).
214. See supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text.
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an even more significant role in ensuring executions are administered in a fair
and humane manner than access to hearing the execution in its entirety, which
the Ninth Circuit has already recognized the public has a constitutional right to
access.
The same rationale applies to access to information about the
qualifications of executioners. Although executioners have been historically
“hooded,”215 the Ninth Circuit in Woodford and in Ryan did not find that the
safety and privacy of the executioner was an important enough government
interest to restrict the viewing or hearing of executions.216 Because the
executioner’s identity is already exposed by modern protocols used during
publicly accessible executions,217 whether executioners actually remain “hooded”
today is arguable. Moreover, participation in an execution is voluntary in a
number of states,218 indicating that executioners are thus aware of the
“controversial nature” of their employment.219
More importantly, the value in public access to information about the
qualifications of executioners outweighs the interests in concealing their
identities. This would serve as a check on the government and to ensure that
executioners are qualified to carry out an execution properly and humanely.
And “[m]aking executioner identities and qualifications subject to scrutiny
would provide an incentive for prison officials to adequately screen potential
executioners.”220
States could also make the qualifications of their execution team public
without revealing the identity of the executioners.221 Revealing only the
qualifications of executioners somewhat hinders the ability of the public to
verify information reported by a department of corrections. However, it can
still incentivize the hiring of qualified personnel and would create
accountability and transparency.

215. Ellyde Roko, Note, Executioner Identities: Toward Recognizing a Right to Know Who is Hiding
Beneath the Hood, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2796 (2007).
216. See First Amend. Coal. of Ariz., Inc. v. Ryan, 938 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2019); Woodford,
299 F.3d at 880.
217. See Ryan, 938 F.3d at 1077.
218. See Denno, supra note 32, app. 1, tbl.17, at 156–69 (noting the execution team in Arizona,
Delaware, Georgia, New Mexico, and Washington is comprised of either volunteers or contracted
persons).
219. See Roko, supra note 215, at 2814.
220. Id. at 2825.
221. Id. at 2827.
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A More Deferential Standard of Review than Strict Scrutiny Would Still Favor
a Right of Access to Execution-Related Information

Traditionally, the right of access can be overcome by an overriding
governmental interest.222 However, instead of applying a strict scrutiny
analysis, the Ninth Circuit in Ryan evaluated whether Arizona’s procedures met
judicial scrutiny by applying the Turner standard,223 a more deferential standard
of review usually employed to determine the reasonableness of prison
regulations.224 In turn, when evaluating the public’s right to access executionrelated information, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the Turner standard to
assess reasonableness since the court failed to apply the history and logic test to
this claim in the first place. But as this Recent Development argues, the Ninth
Circuit should have applied the history and logic test to the claim of a right to
access execution-related information. This section finishes the analysis lacking
in the Ryan opinion by applying the Turner standard to evaluate the
reasonableness of Arizona’s procedure to keep execution-related information
confidential.
Under the Turner standard, a prison regulation is constitutional if it is
“‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological objectives” and does not
“represent[] an ‘exaggerated response’ to those concerns.”225 The Turner
standard requires the application of four different factors, each discussed in
turn.
1. The Prison Regulation Must Have a Valid Rational Connection to a
Legitimate Government Interest
The first Turner factor requires a “‘valid, rational connection’ between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to
justify it.”226 Some interests cited by other states to justify the lack of disclosure
include vague notions of security and safety.227 In Wood v. Ryan, the first case
related to Wood’s execution, Arizona argued that disclosing this kind of
information would “deter drug manufacturers from providing lethal injection
drugs and lead to public disclosure of the identities of those who will administer
222. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (“Absent an overriding
interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.”).
223. See supra Section III.C.2.
224. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987) (outlining the four factors of the Turner test).
Some have argued for a different level of scrutiny, which gives “some deference to any asserted and
legitimate penological interests” but considers “any feasible alternatives available to the public and
press in exercising their role in an informed public debate.” See Rachel South, Comment, Compounding
the Risk of Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Right To Know the Manufacturer and Compounds Used in
Georgia’s Lethal Injection Drugs, 7 J. MARSHALL L.J. 579, 638 (2014).
225. Turner, 482 U.S. at 87.
226. Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
227. See id. at 91.

99 N.C. L. REV. 1587 (2021)

2021]

THE SOUND OF DEATH AND “SHROUD OF SECRECY”

1613

the drugs.”228 However, the Ninth Circuit found no evidence in the record
supporting this claim.229 In First Amendment Coalition of Arizona, Inc. v. Ryan,
the second case in the series, no government interest was discussed by the court
in favor of concealing execution-related information.230 Thus, a rational
connection between the regulation and the government interest does not seem
to exist.
2. Alternative Means of Exercising the Right Must Exist and Remain Open to
Prison Inmates
The second Turner factor asks whether there are “alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.”231 There is no
alternative, legal means through which the press or the public could gather the
information regarding what lethal injection drugs are being used in a facility
and whether the personnel are qualified unless the prison willingly gives up that
information.232 States’ lack of disclosure of information comes at “the direct
expense of the public’s ability to report on information it conceals.”233 Without
Arizona’s direct disclosure of the information sought after, plaintiffs in Ryan
would have no alternative access to information about the source and
manufacturer of the drugs; the drugs’ lot numbers, NDCs, and expiration dates;
and the qualification of executioners.
3. The Impact of Accommodating the Asserted Constitutional Right Must Be
Considered
The third Turner factor asks what “impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation
of prison resources generally.”234 Considering the prison already has the
information being sought, the main expense the prison would have to bear is
the expense of copying or releasing information to the public—which is minimal
228. Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.), vacated, 573 U.S. 976 (2014).
229. Id. (“[T]he State can point to no evidence in the record to support its claim that
pharmaceutical companies will stop providing drugs if this information is released or that no
alternatives are available even if some companies do change course. There is nothing in the record, save
speculation, that manufacturers will not provide the product. . . . Similarly, the State fails to point to
evidence to support its claim that releasing the qualifications of those administering the execution will
lead them to being identified publicly.”).
230. See First Amend. Coal. of Ariz., Inc. v. Ryan, 938 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding
there was not a right of access to the execution information and therefore not proceeding to a Turner
analysis).
231. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
232. See South, supra note 224, at 643 (“There are no longer any effective alternatives available to
the public to obtain information regarding the . . . preparation of the lethal injection drug.”).
233. Nathanial A.W. Crider, Note, What You Don’t Know Will Kill You: A First Amendment Challenge
to Lethal Injection Secrecy, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 54 (2014).
234. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
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considering the ease with which documents are digitized. And as previously
noted, the Ninth Circuit did not recognize that anonymity of personnel was a
legitimate governmental interest to restrict the sounds of executions,
considering other identifying features of the execution process.235 Thus, the
anonymity of personnel should be a de minimis consideration against the
disclosure of personnel qualifications.
4. No Other Obvious, Easy Alternative Exists That Accommodates Both
Prisoners’ Rights and Valid Penological Interests
Finally, the fourth Turner factor asks whether there are “obvious, easy
alternatives . . . that fully accommodate[] the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost
to valid penological interests.”236 If such an alternative exists, then a prison
regulation could be considered unreasonable.237 Alternatives could be employed
to protect prison staff while not hindering the public’s right to information. For
example, the state could release the qualifications of executioners without
revealing their names or identifying information.238 Thus, a wholesale
disclosure ban on any information relating to executioners’ qualifications is
unreasonable and an exaggerated response to an already weak penological
interest in the anonymity of executioners.
Even under this more deferential standard of review, the Turner factors
strongly favor a right of access to execution-related information because (1) the
history and logic test is satisfied; (2) there is no valid connection between
maintaining the secrecy of lethal injection drug information and the
qualifications of execution personnel to a legitimate penological interest; (3)
there are easy, legal alternatives to maintain the anonymity of personnel; and
(4) the impact to inmates, personnel, and prison resources is minimal.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit in Ryan mistakenly relied on persuasive, rather than
binding, precedent and failed to apply the history and logic test to recognize a
right of access to execution-related information. Granting access to information
about lethal injection drugs and the qualifications of execution team members
plays a significant role in ensuring that executions are administered fairly and
235. Ryan, 938 F.3d at 1077 (“The defendants attempt to justify the restrictions by arguing that
they have a legitimate penological interest in ensuring that execution team members are not publicly
identified or attacked. But, according to the factual allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint, witnesses
can hear sounds from the execution room as the execution team brings the prisoner into the room,
secures him to the table, and inserts the intravenous lines. Thus, to the extent that execution team
members could be identified by the sound of their voices, witnesses can already hear their voices during
the initial stages of the execution.”).
236. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–91.
237. Id. at 91.
238. See Roko, supra note 215, at 2827.
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humanely. Moreover, the public has historically had access to this method of
execution. Even though the Turner standard can be a limiting factor to the right
of access in the context of prisons, the factors suggest that in this case, the
government’s interests do not overcome the First Amendment right of access,
indicating that execution-related information should be open to the public.
Without such access, determining whether executions are fairly and
humanely administered becomes an impossible task. “When a state hides critical
information from the public regarding the most serious criminal sanction it
permits, it violates [the] core democratic values” of legitimacy and
accountability.239 Absent substantial reform, states will continue to procure
lethal injection drugs from substandard suppliers and perform executions with
unqualified staff. At a minimum, the public should have information about the
source and manufacturers of execution drugs and the qualifications of
individuals carrying out executions. Access to more information surrounding
execution by lethal injection increases transparency and accountability, placing
a check on the government to administer lethal injections fairly and humanely.
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